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On April 18–19, 2008, the University of Pennsylvania Law School
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Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective.” 1 This Conference
was the first major event for Penn’s newly established Center for
Technology, Innovation, and Competition (CTIC), a research institute
committed to promoting basic research into foundational frameworks that
will shape the way policymakers think about technology-related issues in
the future.
The breakup of AT&T represents an ideal starting point for
examining the major threads of telecommunications policy that have
emerged over the past quarter century. Although the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) had already begun implementing
many of the measures eventually incorporated into the consent decree that
settled the case, commonly known as the Modification of Final Judgment
(MFJ), 2 the divestiture of AT&T’s local operating companies and the
accompanying mandate to provide equal access to all long-distance and
information service providers (ISPs) nonetheless represents the major
milestone in the attempt to promote greater competition in the
telecommunications industry.
The Conference brought together what one attendee called “the most
distinguished group of telecommunications scholars ever assembled in one
room.” The final conference lineup included two former FCC
Commissioners, six former FCC Chief Economists, and four former Heads
of Economic Analysis of either the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division
or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Many of the panelists and
moderators played key roles in shaping the policy either as members of the
Justice Department staff that litigated the case or of the FCC staff charged
with implementing the decree and integrating it into the regulatory regime
governing telecommunications. The conference was attended by
distinguished scholars as well as staff from the FCC and the FTC interested
in telecommunications and antitrust policy. This unique combination of
subject matter, presentations, and audience made for a very memorable
event.

I. LOOKING BACK AT DIVESTITURE: WHAT WORKED? WHAT
DIDN’T?
The initial panel brought together a distinguished group of people
who played key roles in the AT&T litigation. Their presentations offered
differing opinions about whether the breakup of AT&T represented a

1. The conference program and webcasts of the panels are available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ctic/conferences/att/index.html.
2. United States v. AT&T Co. (Modification of Final Judgment), 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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policy success or a policy failure, as well as which aspects of the breakup
played out as expected and which aspects emerged as surprises.
Roger Noll, who helped develop the government’s case against
AT&T, noted how that case sharpened the debate between, and improved
the quality of research into, the optimistic and pessimistic visions of the
perfectibility of regulation and whether antitrust can compensate for
regulation’s shortcomings. In addition, the experience implementing the
breakup of AT&T revealed that antitrust courts were no better at dealing
with anticompetitive behavior than were regulators. Noll nonetheless
suggested that the emergence of a competitive Internet and wireless
industry would have been delayed if the court had not mandated equal
access to and interconnection with the local telephone network.
Paul MacAvoy, who was one of the defense experts in the
government’s case against AT&T, focuses on an anomaly of divestiture:
the price of long-distance service relative to marginal cost (also known as
the Lerner Index) surprisingly increased after divestiture and increased still
further following the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(1996 Act). This fact suggests that these measures may not have been as
successful in promoting meaningful competition in the telephone industry
as generally thought.
Alfred Kahn, who served on AT&T’s National Advisory Board
during the early stages of the case, observed that the vision of promoting
competition through vertical disintegration underlying the breakup of
AT&T was not realized until after the enactment of the 1996 Act. He
believes this has been unfairly maligned. Kahn found the same issues are
being replayed in the debates over network neutrality, which he called a
“terrifying abomination.” The better solution, in Kahn’s opinion, is to
promote the emergence of a third independent Internet access provider,
most likely in the form of wireless.
Joseph Weber was the Director of Network Architecture Planning for
AT&T. He helped craft the MFJ’s technical appendix, oversaw much of the
actual implementation of the divestiture, and provided an overview of the
regulatory and historical background for the case. He speculated that the
real impetus for competition was technological change, which in turn
suggested that competition would have emerged even if divestiture had
never occurred.

II. EQUAL ACCESS AS THE NEW REGULATORY PARADIGM: THE
TRANSITION FROM RATE REGULATION TO ACCESS REGULATION
The breakup of AT&T was a landmark in the shift away from rate
regulation, which grants customers access to the entire network, toward
access regulation, which grants competitors access to portions of the
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network. Another panel explored the successes and the new challenges
posed by this new regulatory paradigm, examining its workability, its
impact on static and dynamic efficiency, and the extent to which it now
serves as a model for other countries and industries.
Glen Robinson, an FCC Commissioner during the early stages of the
government’s suit against AT&T, noted that both the MFJ and the 1996
Act reflected the belief that new entrants would use access to the
incumbent’s network as a stepping stone to full-fledged, facilities-based
competition. The mounting empirical evidence indicates that this dynamic
has failed to materialize. He further observed that the reduction in
regulation that many thought would accompany the shift to a new
regulatory paradigm based on access regulation has also failed to
materialize.
Tim Wu offered a distinction between two types of access mandates.
On the one hand are zero-price rules, which include the rules governing
customer premises equipment (CPE), the regime established by Computer
II, 3 and the network neutrality conditions imposed on the AT&T/BellSouth
merger. On the other hand are access fee rules, which include long-distance
access charges and unbundled network element (UNE) access under the
1996 Act. Wu argues that zero-price rules are more effective in creating
markets that operate without requiring any cooperation from the
incumbent.
As a presenter, I pointed out that the current approach to access
regulation fails to take into account the different ways particular networks
are configured or to take into account the interactions among network
components that allow networks to compensate for unexpected changes in
demand by rerouting traffic through different portions of the network.
Presenting this joint work with Daniel Spulber, I offered a model of
network regulation based on the branch of mathematics known as “graph
theory” that captures the way in which networks constitute complex
systems. This approach holds the promise of unifying the different types of
access to local telephone networks into a single, overarching framework
that can provide insights into optimal network configuration, cost, capacity,
and reliability, as well as a basis for determining the likely impact of
different types of access mandates.
Former FCC Chief Economist Gerald Faulhaber observed that access
regulation requires the continued imposition of rate regulation for an
extended period of time. He also offered a theory of successful access
regulation that depends on one of two conditions being met. Either the

3. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986).
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access interface must be simple and easy to monitor or the incumbent must
not compete directly with new entrants in downstream markets.

III. KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE RICHARD A.
POSNER
In his keynote address, Judge Richard Posner described the role he
played both as General Counsel of President Johnson’s Task Force on
Communications Policy—which, as Roger Noll noted, initiated the analysis
that established the groundwork for the government’s case against
AT&T—and as a consultant to AT&T during the early stages of the case.
His witty observations and reflections yield the type of insights into how
AT&T’s internal culture and decision making shaped its response to the
case that only a person who was actually there can provide.

IV. STRUCTURAL SEPARATION IN DYNAMIC MARKETS:
LESSONS FOR THE INTERNET, LESSONS FOR EUROPE
Recent developments, most notably the Microsoft litigation, the
Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T mergers, and the European Commission’s
review of its e-communications regulatory framework have given new
emphasis to debates over the effectiveness of structural separation as a
remedy. This panel explored the insights that the breakup of AT&T
provides into the relative merits of structural separation and vertical
integration, as well as the unique problems that structural separation poses.
Joseph Farrell, who served as FCC Chief Economist during the
implementation of the 1996 Act and as Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Economic Analysis for the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division,
suggested that the complexity of the economics of vertical integration may
make it hard for business executives to discern the true incentives. He
further suggested that modern competition policy may have become a bit
too doctrinaire in focusing on incentives, and in so doing, has overlooked
the potential value of openness, diversity, and imagination.
Eli Noam offered insight into the current debate over structural
separation taking place in Europe by presenting data comparing the
performance of the U.S. telecommunications industry to Canada’s, which
achieved similar results without undergoing a breakup of the incumbent.
The similarity of outcomes raises serious questions about the necessity and
efficacy of structural separation as a remedy.
Former FCC Chief Economist Michael Riordan discussed the current
proposal to implement universal service through reverse auctions,
particularly the concern that the auction winner might need access to the
incumbent’s network should the incumbent lose the auction. The model he
proposed showed how structural separation can facilitate nondiscriminatory
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access to the incumbent’s network and can blunt the distorting effects of
stranded costs. In addition, the model indicates that a provision of advanced
services can reduce the need for universal service subsidies.
Michael Salinger, who recently served as Director of the FTC’s
Bureau of Economics, offered a broad survey of previous efforts to impose
structural separation, identifying a handful of success stories and a larger
number of failures. In his opinion, the success of structural separation
depended not on regulators’ ability to promote entry into the portions of the
industry in which competition had newly become possible, but rather on
their ability to exercise continuing oversight over the portion of the
industry that was likely to remain noncompetitive. Salinger applied this
analysis to the network neutrality debate, opining that the difficulty of
regulating an industry as new and complex as broadband made regulatory
intervention inadvisable.

V. FROM THE MFJ TO TRINKO: THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
DOCTRINE AND THE PROPER PROVINCES OF ANTITRUST AND
REGULATION
The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Trinko 4 called into question
two of the MFJ’s central premises: first, the propriety of invoking Section 2
of the Sherman Act 5 to mandate access to telecommunications networks,
and second, that antitrust courts can play a constructive role in overseeing
the telecommunications industry. The participants in this panel offered a
range of views regarding how much room is left for antitrust courts after
Trinko.
Daniel Spulber, presenting another aspect of the research project that
we are pursuing together, laid out a five-part system for classifying
different types of access based on the graph-theory-inspired approach
discussed above. In addition, he analyzed access mandates through the
Coasian theory of the firm, showing how access mandates compel the
externalization of functions that would more efficiently be provided within
the boundaries of the firm. He then employed this framework to analyze
recent efforts to use the antitrust laws to mandate access to
telecommunications networks, showing how different types of access have
implications for network design, operating costs, and transaction costs.
Michael Katz, former FCC Chief Economist and former Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis for the Justice
Department’s Antitrust Division, argued that antitrust authorities still have
a role in telecommunications policy after Trinko, particularly in the areas of
4. See Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
5. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, sec. 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1-7 (2000)).
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policing price fixing and reviewing mergers. He then asked what would be
a sensible division of labor between the FCC and the antitrust enforcement
authorities. Katz argued in favor of centralizing merger review authority in
the antitrust enforcement agencies to the exclusion of the FCC, pointing to
the antitrust authorities’ greater emphasis on the analysis provided by
economists, their greater ability to develop more extensive factual records,
their greater insulation from political pressures, as well as the greater
clarity of the legal standard being applied, the stronger degree of judicial
oversight, the presence of more rigid time constraints, and the limits on
remedial discretion.
Timothy Brennan, who worked on the government’s case against
AT&T, argued that Trinko signals a shift away from viewing antitrust and
regulatory enforcement as complements in favor of viewing them as
substitutes, in which one operates to the exclusion of the other. Indeed, he
speculates that the MFJ would not have been allowed to proceed had
Trinko been the law at the time. Despite his sympathies for the continued
regard of antitrust and regulation as complementary, Brennan questioned
whether the clash of institutional cultures between the antitrust authorities
and the FCC would permit a coherent complementary enforcement policy
to emerge.
Former FCC Chief Economist Howard Shelanski examined the range
of possible readings of Trinko, concluding that it creates a presumption
against antitrust enforcement in regulated industries where a statute
provides for continuing oversight and enforcement by a regulatory agency.
The Trinko opinion is less clear about how to determine when an industry
is sufficiently regulated to trigger the presumption against antitrust
enforcement. This ambiguity raises the danger that the presence of a
nominal regulatory regime might insulate carriers from meaningful scrutiny
under either antitrust or regulation.

VI. REGULATION BY CONSENT DECREE: LESSONS FOR
MICROSOFT AND BEYOND
Commentators have long debated the efficacy of consent decrees.
Some have focused on the relative merits of structural and behavioral
relief. Others have suggested that consent decrees represent a way for
defendants to evade liability even when they have violated the antitrust
laws. Still others suggest that consent decrees allow the government to
impose liability even when no antitrust violation has occurred. This panel
employed the consent decrees settling the cases against AT&T and
Microsoft 6 as lenses to explore the various sides of these debates.
6. United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. A. No. 98-1232(CKK), 2002 WL 31654530
(D.D.C., 2002), as modified by U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 2006 WL 2882808 (D.D.C., 2006).
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Richard Epstein contended that the distinction between conduct and
structural remedies is somewhat overdrawn, illustrated by the extensiveness
of the conduct requirements needed to implement the supposedly structural
remedy imposed by the MFJ. A better way to evaluate the choice of
remedies is through examining the fit between the competitive harm proven
and the remedy imposed. Thus, the fact that the core problem raised by the
case was AT&T’s refusal to interconnect with emerging long-distance
carriers like MCI suggests that the same results could have been
accomplished without divestiture simply by imposing an interconnection
requirement.
Robert Crandall observed that his comprehensive survey of structural
remedies had turned up only one instance in which structural remedies had
apparently yielded welfare benefits: the breakup of AT&T. Even in that
case, the fact that Canada and the EU achieved reductions in long-distance
prices similar to those that occurred in the United States simply by
imposing equal access without mandating divestiture suggests that the same
benefits might have been achieved without imposing a structural remedy.
Crandall also presented data proposing that the consent decree imposed in
the Microsoft case had very little impact on the financial performance of
Microsoft or its competitors, which raised questions about the benefits of
antitrust intervention in that case as well.
Daniel Rubinfeld, who served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General
for Economic Analysis for the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division
during the Microsoft case, noted that the Department strongly favors
structural remedies over conduct remedies. Indeed, he found his skepticism
of conduct remedies borne out by the difficulties that the current
Administration was facing in monitoring Microsoft’s compliance with the
conduct remedies in the consent decree. Given the lack of bite in the
conduct remedies imposed, Rubinfeld expressed scant surprise that the
Microsoft consent decree had little effect. He would have preferred
imposing a structural remedy, arguing that it would have yielded
substantial benefits in increased innovation.
Philip Weiser noted that platform industries suffer from a
commitment problem, with network owners’ reluctance to incur sunk costs
being matched by complementary service providers’ fear of retroactive
opportunism. He suggested that such problems are best addressed through
disclosure, standard setting, and nondiscrimination norms, but argued that
the case for restricting vertical integration was weak. He also presented a
case for reforming the process for reviewing telecommunications mergers
in a way that makes antitrust and regulatory oversight more
The complete anti-trust case filings can be found on the Department of Justice webpage at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm.
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complementary. Under this approach, the regulatory agencies would defer
to the competition policy analysis of the antitrust enforcement authorities,
while the antirust authorities would consult with the FCC before imposing
any conduct remedies.

VII. THE FUTURE OF INTERCARRIER COMPENSATION
The breakup of AT&T gave newfound importance to debates over
intercarrier compensation that now encompass new services, such as voice
over Internet protocol (VoIP) as well as traditional telecommunications.
This panel discussed how these compensation regimes will be shaped in the
future and how reform of the current system of intercarrier compensation is
being constrained by the political support for universal service.
Gerald Brock, who served both as a consultant to the Justice
Department during the government’s case and as Chief of the Common
Carrier Bureau during the implementation of the MFJ, reviewed the
controversies over intercarrier compensation spawned by divestiture, with a
particular emphasis on how political constraints prevented the
implementation of a more economically rational system. Although he was
once optimistic about major intercarrier compensation reform, he is now
less so. Given the political infeasibility of abolishing access charges
altogether, Brock suggested that policymakers should focus on the more
limited goal of eliminating the opportunities for opportunistic behavior by
rural carriers created by the current access charge regime.
Former FCC Chief Economist Simon Wilkie offered a concrete
proposal for eliminating the incentives for arbitrage by small rural carriers
caused by the current access charge regime. Under his proposal, the reverse
auction currently contemplated for distributing the direct universal service
subsidy for high-cost areas would be expanded to include the implicit
subsidy represented by the above-cost portion of long-distance access
charges. Carriers participating in the reverse auction would have to agree to
interconnect with other carriers through bill-and-keep arrangements, which
would eliminate the incentive for opportunistic behavior. Carriers not
participating in the reverse auction would no longer benefit from
mandatory interconnection.
James Speta explored a series of paths through which
telecommunications reform might occur. He viewed the unintentionalist
paths—such as allowing the system to collapse from its own weight or
relying on the combination of greed and unintended consequences—as
unlikely to yield significant results. He also expressed skepticism that a
heroic regulator or legislator could accomplish reform directly and found
that the downsides of a bargain, in which the biggest loser is compensated
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for its losses, outweighed the upsides. The best hope lay, in Speta’s
opinion, in a sneaky regulator or legislator pursuing incremental change.
Kevin Werbach challenged the premise of the panel, speculating that
future debates may focus neither on intercarrier relationships nor on
compensation. With digital convergence placing less emphasis on calls, the
focus will shift towards relationships among providers of all types of
network services rather than simply carriers, which in turn will encompass
a much broader array of companies. Furthermore, these relationships may
not involve compensation should the terms of interconnection become
dominated by bill-and-keep arrangements.

***
All in all, the panels and discussions made for a very memorable
weekend. CTIC and all of the conference participants are grateful to the
Federal Communications Law Journal for agreeing to publish all of the
presentations that developed into formal papers, along with an additional
paper authored by Jerry Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak, and Timothy Tardiff
that was originally scheduled to be part of the conference, but was not
presented due to a last-minute conflict. We believe that the presentations at
the conference and the resulting articles published here represent an
important contribution that will provide insights for both scholars and
policymakers for years to come.

